International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Instrument for Reconciliation, Peace and Security in the Western Balkans? by Grković, Obrad
 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia: An Instrument for Reconciliation, Peace 







This paper analyzes the role of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the context of peace building in the Western Balkans. The central 
question raised is whether the ICTY, which is the forefather of the permanent 
International Criminal Court (ICC), can be considered an institution that really plays a 
role in the reconciliation process of ex-Yugoslav states that were involved in the 
Yugoslav Wars and by doing so, does it provide peace and security in this turbulent 
region. Essentially the conclusion drawn is that the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia is an ineffective tool in reconciling all parties involved in the 
Yugoslav Wars, and cannot instil a sense of peace and security through justice in the 
region. This is because of (1) the ICTY’s seemingly bias approach to justice due to 
disproportional indictments and (2) the widespread scepticism of ex-Yugoslav states that 
justice will help in peace building and create sustainable security in the Western Balkans.  
 
Résumé : 
Cet essai analyse le rôle du Tribunal Pénal International pour l'ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY) 
dans le contexte du renforcement de la paix dans les Balkans occidentaux. La question 
centrale soulevée est à savoir si le TPIY, qui est l'ancêtre de la Cour Pénale Internationale 
permanente (CPI), peut être considérée comme une institution qui joue vraiment un rôle 
dans le processus de réconciliation des États ex-Yougoslaves qui ont été impliqués dans 
les Guerres Yougoslaves et ce faisant, s’il fournit la paix et la sécurité dans cette région 
turbulente. Essentiellement, la conclusion tirée est que le Tribunal Pénal International 
pour l'ex-Yougoslavie est un outil inefficace pour concilier toutes les parties impliquées 
dans les Guerres Yougoslaves et ne peut susciter par la justice un sentiment de paix et de 
sécurité dans la région. Cette conclusion est tirée des causes suivantes : (1) l’approche 
apparente de polarisation de la TPIY à la justice en raison de mises en accusation 
disproportionnés et (2) le scepticisme généralisé des États ex-Yougoslaves que la justice 
aidera grâce au renforcement de la paix et à la création d’une sécurité durable dans les 




On November 16th, 2012, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) acquitted Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač, two Croatian generals most 
responsible for Operation Storm that resulted in the slaughter of “at least 150 Serbs”1 and 
the displacement of “about 250,000 Croatian Serbs”2 from Croatia. Two weeks later, on 
November 28th, 2012, the same tribunal acquitted another war criminal by the name of 
Ramush Haradinaj who committed atrocities on the Serbian, Roma and Albanian 
populations in Kosovo.3 Most recently, on February 28th, 2013, Momčilo Perišić, a 
Serbian general from the late Yugoslav National Army was also acquitted by the ICTY 
despite his involvement in Srebrenica and Sarajevo.4 All of these releases by the tribunal 
have revived and intensified tensions between ex Yugoslav which leads to the question: 
is the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia really an instrument for 
reconciliation, peace and security in the Western Balkans? Since the ICTY is one of the 
so-called forefathers of the International Criminal Court (ICC), it is important to 
thoroughly analyze the implications of this specific international tribunal in relations to 
peace-building and reintroducing security in the region. By doing so, it will shed light on 
the future success of the ICC and similar institutions (International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda for example) in maintaining international peace and security, as “the success of 
the [ICTY][will] ultimately become the basis for the debate over the need for a                                                         
1 Victor Peskin, “Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting the Winners at the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,” Journal of Human Rights 4(2005): 218, 
accessed March 15th, 2013, doi:10.1080/14754830590952152. 
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permanent international criminal institution which resulted in the International Criminal 
Court (ICC).”5  
In the academic literature examined, there is a general sentiment among scholars 
that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is an ineffective tool 
in reconciling all parties involved in the Yugoslav Wars, and cannot instil a sense of 
peace and security through justice in the region. As Dominic Raab simply puts it, “the 
ICTY’s results had not been spectacular.”6 Two principal reasons for this are (1) the 
ICTY’s seemingly biased approach to justice due to disproportional indictments of all 
sides in the war, leading to strained cooperation between the ICTY and the ex-Yugoslav 
states, and (2) the widespread scepticism of ex-Yugoslav states that justice will help in 
peace-building and create sustainable security in the Western Balkans.  
 
Yugoslav Wars and the Creation the ICTY 
The Yugoslav Wars, which started on March 31st, 1991 with the War in Croatia and 
lasted until the end of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in June 1999, are commonly 
referred to as being the four armed conflicts (the War in Slovenia, the Croatian War of 
Independence, the Bosnian War and the Kosovo War including the NATO bombing of 
Yugoslavia) that brought about the breakup (or dissolution) of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. Numerous war crimes, crimes against humanity and grave 
violations of international humanitarian law were committed during this period by all 
parties, involving: “murder, torture, rape, enslavement, destruction of property and other 
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violent crimes”7 that shocked the international community and brought about the 
introduction of the ICTY.   
The ICTY was created by the United Nations Security Council, through resolution 
8278, in 1993 “in response to the atrocities that engulfed the former Yugoslavia” and was 
considered “the world’s first truly international criminal court.”9  It was established as an 
“ad hoc, territorially specific, international criminal tribunal”10 to put “those most 
responsible for violations of the most heinous crimes known to the international 
community – war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide”11 on trial.  Essentially, 
by putting the main perpetrators on trial, the ICTY’s aim was to “render justice to 
thousands of victims and their families, thus contributing to a lasting peace in the area”12 
or simply “restore international peace and security.”13 Furthermore, this institution 
“would send the message both to potential aggressors and vulnerable minorities that the 
international community will not allow brute force to become the arbiter of disputes.”14   
What made this tribunal different from the post-World War II tribunals,  (namely, 
the Nuremburg Trials and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East) was that 
“this court would be open to membership from all over the globe and would draw on 
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experiences from the different legal systems of the world.”15 The ICTY “combined 
common law/civil law procedures and legal environments”16 and encompasses “the 
Judges and staff of…over 80 countries.”17 In addition, the ICTY was established during 
the Yugoslav Wars in a “sense of emergence” and “sought to strengthen the procedural 
safeguards of the accused and thereby dispel the spectre of ‘victor’s justice’”, which were 
not the cases with the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials.18 It was the first such tribunal in 
many ways and carved the path for the creation of a permanent International Criminal 
Court in 2002 whose scope is similar to that of the ICTY. Nevertheless, “the attitude of 
the international community to war crimes tribunals is currently characterized by a degree 
of ambivalence”19 because of reasons which will now be outlined in the context of the 
ICTY.  
 
ICTY as a Biased Instrument    
The Security Council bases the success of the ICTY on the level of cooperation between 
the ex-Yugoslav states involved in the Yugoslav wars and this institution. Essentially 
“the states of former Yugoslavia…have a binding legal obligation to provide the tribunals 
full and immediate cooperation”20 and with it, allow “entities authorized by the Security 
Council to investigate or prosecute war crimes and other violations of international 
humanitarian law.”21  However, one of the reasons why full and consistent cooperation 
                                                        
15 John Hocking, “Legal Aid,” 529.  
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was not achieved is because Serbia and Croatia both deem the ICTY as being anti-Serb 
and anti-Croat respectively with its seemingly selective and disproportionate indictments 
and, at first, severe prosecutions against their so-called ‘heroes’. Because of this strained 
cooperation, the tribunal cannot be seen as a successful instrument in maintaining peace 
and security in the region, but, rather an instigator for the revitalizing of tensions in the 
region. 
 For Serbia, the ICTY is deemed an institution that executes ‘victor’s justice’ 
instead of proportionally indicting all relevant actors. In relation to this, Oliver Shuett 
mentions: “the argument could be made that the tribunal has become biased as the 
majority of the 70 or so indicted persons are Bosnian Serbs…the tribunal’s attentions 
could be seen to reflect an imbalance in the international community’s tendency to lay 
blame almost exclusively on the Bosnian Serbs.”22 What makes Serbia “against the 
tribunal for its supposed anti-Serb bias”23 is that the Prosecutor’s Office has not 
investigated and pressed charges against a number of atrocities that were committed 
against Serbs, Roma and other minority groups by the Muslim forces, such as the 
“shelling of friendly targets”24 in Sarajevo, or by NATO forces “in connection with 
civilian casualties in Serbia.”25  If analyzing it from this perspective, it should not be 
surprising that during Slobodan Milošević’s reign, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
rejected cooperating with the ICTY. Furthermore, it is not surprising that after 
Milošević’s reign, the Serbian government had great difficulties in tracking down 
Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić (the last two Serbian indictments) due to the 
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obstructions brought about by a number of people who tried to hide them because of 
ICTY’s ‘injustice’. 
In the case of Croatia, many Croatians felt that the ICTY was “anti-Croat”26 
because it pursued the indictment of Ante Gotovina and other generals who were deemed 
heroes in their country because of the Homeland Wars. Because of this negative 
sentiment, Franjo Tudjman “refus[ed] to countenance investigations of the Homeland 
War”27 and “refused to recognize the tribunal’s legal rights to trump state sovereignty 
and probe the Homeland War atrocities.”28 This, in hand, led “tribunal officials [to] press 
Tudjman for cooperation and frequently criticize his conduct.”29 Nevertheless, what 
made the ICTY seem illegitimate and biased, from the Serbian perspective, was that 
“from September 1996 through August 1999 the ICTY did not issue a formal complaint 
to the UN Security Council regarding Croatia’s non-compliance in the Homeland War 
investigations”30 because “the Security Council was reluctant to apply sanctions or 
seriously punish Croatia.”31 This was not the case for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
who was put under economic and political sanctions during Milošević’s later reign. 
Because of Croatia’s non-compliance with the ICTY for a period of time, it seemed that 
“the best hope of bringing victors [supposedly the Croatians] to justice lay in domestic 
political change and the emergence of a more cooperative government in Zagreb.”32     
 Yet another aspect that hindered the ICTY’s cooperation with ex-Yugoslav states, 
and its instilment of reconciliation, peace and security in the region, was the fact that                                                         
26 Victor Peskin, “Beyond Victor’s Justice,” 220. 
27 ibid,221. 
28 ibid, 219.  
29 ibid, 218.  
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politicians in ex-Yugoslavia deemed the ICTY as being “inherently selective because 
some countries [were] targeted for international prosecution [like the Former Yugoslavia] 
whereas other countries [were] not (e.g. Angola).”33 All of these different examples 
manifest that because ex-Yugoslav countries had negative perceptions of the ICTY, and 
decided not to fully cooperate with it (where full cooperation would lead to ICTY 
fulfilling its mandate and bringing about reconciliation, peace and security) This 
institution could not have been viewed as a force that could reintroduce peace in the 
region. This is in part because “the truths established by the ICTY are not universally 
accepted truths, but rather partially contested truths, which compete with each side’s own 
victim-centred narrative.”34  
 
Miscorrelation Between Justice and Peace  
The first President of the ICTY as well as the first Prosecutor both stated that in essence 
“…Peace and Justice go hand-in-hand” and that the tribunal “would contribute to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace…and contribute to ensuring that such violations [of 
international humanitarian law] are halted and effectively redressed.” The relationship 
between the two notions is discussed quite frequently in the literature, yet there is much 
contention between scholars whether justice brings about peace. By looking at the ICTY 
as an example, there is a plethora of evidence that suggests the presence of a sheer gap 
between justice and peace. 
 The lack of interconnectedness between the two vast concepts can be understood 
from the following example. When two individuals that do not get along go to court to                                                         
33 Victor Peskin, “Beyond Victor’s Justice,” 228. 
34 Robert M. Hayden, “What’s Reconciliation Got to do With It,” 320.  
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seek justice over a contentious matter, this does not mean that after the jury’s decision 
they will reconcile and make peace. Essentially, the same scenario applies to the former 
Yugoslavia. Whatever the ICTY decides to do with the indictments will not contribute to 
peace building and security; rather it will intensify the tensions between the ex-Yugoslav 
states if the ICTY keeps making scandalous decisions. This is why “the actions and 
activities of the ICTY have not been beneficial to achieving reconciliation or stability in 
the Balkans” and have kept the region “unstable.”35 As Hayden puts it, “the ICTY’s 
actions are among the major causes of mutual recrimination within most successor 
republics and between them.”36 In retrospect, it was the Dayton Agreement that ended the 
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not the justice of the ICTY. All of these points show that 
the correlation between justice and peace is relatively weak, as in general, “judicial 
institutions are not viewed as organs of peace and security.”37 Therefore, the ICTY’s 
mandate to reintroduce peace in the Balkans through justice is only applicable merely in 
theory. The question that needs to be asked is: what is more important –peace through 
reconciliation or justice? 
 Putting the ICTY in the limelight and war criminals in centre stage has greatly 
marginalized the victims of war. As previously mentioned, the tribunal was essentially 
created for them to get their justice and consequently seek peace. “National reconciliation 
[was] a precondition to a permanent peace”38 in which the main actors were supposed to 
be the victims; however after the creation of the tribunal, they disappeared from the 
picture. Instead of concentrating on the victims and helping with reconciliation and peace 
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building initiatives on the field, the UN Security Council established a very costly 
tribunal (“it is estimated that by the time it shuts down, the ICTY will have spent $2.3 
billion”39) that provides the accused with many benefits, all in hopes of bringing ‘justice’ 
and ‘peace’ in the Western Balkans. The situation is bizarre as “it is immoral to spend 
large amounts of money on them [war criminals] instead of actions that actually do help 
the victims of war.”40  
 By looking at the ICTY in more depth, there are clear indications that the 
beneficiaries of this institution are not the victims “in whose name the enterprise claims 
to operate”41, but instead nationalist political parties in former Yugoslavia who “oppose 
the ICTY…in public” as well as the people who work for ICTY and receive “an 
extensive medical and pension plan, 30 days of annual leave and 10 official holidays a 
year” as well as salaries that go up to “150,000 Euros”42 a year. This is in part why ex-
Yugoslav states have begun to strategically comply with the ICTY as a way to “forestall 
the transfer of an accused or to secure a preferred outcome within a given trial process” 
and avoid “third party enforcements in the form of military, financial and diplomatic 
sanctions”43 in order for them to fulfil their national agendas. Because of the ICTY’s 
institutional and conceptual flaws, the reasons states cooperate with it are not the right 
ones. States strategically comply with the tribunal not for the purpose of seeking justice, 
and through it peace, but for “pragmatic reasons rather than moral ones.”44 Namely, they 
seek political truth rather than judicial truth. By cooperating or complying with the ICTY,                                                         
39 Robert M. Hayden, “What’s Reconciliation Got to do With It,” 322.  
40 Robert M. Hayden, “What’s Reconciliation Got to do With It,” 325.  
41 Robert M. Hayden, “What’s Reconciliation Got to do With It,” 324.  
42 ibid, 321.  
43 Christopher K. Lamont, “Defiance or Strategic Compliance? The Post-Tudjman Croatian Democratic 
Union and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,” Europe-Asia Studies 10(2010): 
1684, accessed March 21st, 2013, doi: 10.1080/09668136.2010.522425.  
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ex-Yugoslav states have more opportunities to receive financial aid from the West and to 
join the European Union. In essence, this is their motivation, not peace and security 
through reconciliation and justice. This shows, once again, that justice in the political 
sense is important for ex-Yugoslav states in order for them to develop economically and 
successfully join the EU. 
 
Conclusion 
Peace and security in the Western Balkans cannot be achieved through justice, at least not 
the justice the ICTY promotes, primarily because of its biasness that results in states not 
cooperating fully with the tribunal and because of its conjecture that justice will result in 
peace and security through reconciliation. Because of these reasons, the ICTY does not 
fulfil its expected mandate, which is not surprising as there were no cases “in which 
externally-imposed criminal trials” brought about “transnational justice”, and in hand, 
peace through reconciliation.45 The general ambivalence towards the ICTY leaves room 
for scepticism with regards to the success of the ICC whose creation can be partially 
contributed to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. This case 
study manifests the need for an innovative 21st century peace-building strategy in post-
conflict regions that diverges from traditional norms wherein justice will bring peace. In 
theory, the interdependence of justice and peace seems logical; however, in practice, 
imposing justice is counterproductive.  
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